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Abstract: 
 
The provision of public properties that generate income for the public sector, used as 
securitization in government bonds, is under consideration both from public and private 
sector during the last few years. The efficient exploitation of the long term contracts under 
Public Private Partnership schemes (either infrastructures or other real assets) that produce 
steady cash inflows can result to a lower cost of borrowing-funding for the State, by linking 
the efficiently priced future expected cash flows of PPP’s, with a special form of sovereign 
covered bonds issued by the Government. This paper, after a review of covered bonds 
advantages and recent market developments, examines the major parameters that 
governmental authorities should review and assess in order to achieve optimal pricing from 
a market point of view of PPP contracts. Such parameters include Primary Objectives of the 
public sector, expectations about future developments in inflation, growth and interest rates, 
availability of government funding and key objectives about management of Public deficit 
and Public debt, as well as the pricing sensitivities of PPP contracts expected cash flows on 
some of these factors. Also the paper develops and assesses the possible uses of PPP 
contracts for the purposes of enhancing the credit quality of new Sovereign Covered Bonds 
(Linked with PPP contracts), together with the broader objective of efficiently mobilizing the 
Public assets portfolio in delivering to the State, efficiently priced and optimal Public 
services and under specific conditions, lower cost of funding or refinancing for the State, 
compared to the unsecured senior debt obligations of the Government.  The standard market 
model of the public sector in pricing PPP’s projects is extended and connected to 
optimization of quantitative objectives of the Public Sector in order to achieve specific 
targets under different assumptions about the underlying variables. Issues of legislation, 
marketability and liquidity of the proposed schemes as well as mutual benefits for the market 
participants are highlighted as well as market practices from the private sector covered bond 
market. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Sovereign entities of the western world rely the provision of public services 
(defense, public health, education, public infrastructures etc.), when tax revenues are 
not adequate, to a large extent on the financing through a considerable amount of 
unsecured public debt via issuance of unsecured senior bonds. In that way, by 
running controllable and scheduled public deficits, they can meet the needs of the 
general government extra financing as well as the required financing of public 
investments, and public services. 
 
On the other end, the States traditionally have on their “balance sheet” considerable 
amounts of real assets (real estate and related infrastructures, as well as monopoly 
companies and special resources monopolies), many of them being potentially 
income generating assets. Recent experience has shown that, the government is not 
always the best manager of its on balance sheet real assets, let alone the managing of 
its public debt obligations. Also it is widely accepted that the private sector is 
usually more efficient in pricing, developing, managing and operating business (and 
therefore managing the related risks) in a competitive environment, with limited 
resources. 
 
As a consequence, Public Private Partnerships evolved as an alternative form of 
asset exploitation, between governments and competitive private companies, where 
each of the two partners brings to the contract its “comparative” advantages, in order 
to make the final partnership viable and profitable for both participants. Such 
structures that efficiently exploit assets and monopoly structures of the government 
through appropriate management from private sector companies, produce efficiently 
public services and manage to their full income generating potential, public assets, 
utilizing therefore the public property with private sector competitive standards. 
The appropriate pricing of the expected cash flows of the contract from both sides, 
taking into consideration all the possible aspects of the project is very important for 
the negotiation process, and selection of the preferred private partner. Optimal 
pricing and efficient selection of the private entity are significant parameters for 
contract’s viability and profitability for all related parties. 
 
Once a PPP is initiated on an existing asset or an asset to be built and run by a 
private company, this contract is the base of a stream of future expected cash flows, 
as well as residual value, and subject to many kinds of pricing risks, having an 
overall net present value as any other real income generating asset, priced in the 
market. Thus far, using the example of many European countries, the issuance of 
public debt for the financing of government deficits was by the issuance of senior 
unsecured bonds. In case of default or partial default of the issuer country, the 
investors have full recourse against the assets of the issuer but only on theory. In 
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practice investors will experience a loss in interest income or redemption amount or 
even both, depending on restructuring type. 
 
After the Global financial crisis of 2007-2008 the market has shifted its focus in 
more efficient pricing of default risk and especially in pricing the Sovereign default 
risk, of many heavily indebted countries, including Greece among others. The 
subsequent result was a general widening of yield levels of many sovereigns and in 
many cases in levels where the traditional market channel of funding became 
unavailable to the State.  Sovereign States were in the midst of a crisis where due to 
the economic downturn, fiscal consolidation was needed while public investments 
and services needed also a boost in order to compensate for the deterioration of 
private investments and consumption, and all these in an environment with higher 
credit spreads, less liquidity and more risk averse investors. 
 
On the side of these, as history has shown, the private sector, and especially private 
banks in many countries around the world, were able in similar situations, of credit 
squeezes and illiquid markets, to refinance their balance sheet by the issuance of 
covered bond schemes, achieving market acceptability and substantially lower cost 
of funding, when the senior unsecured debt was prohibitively expensive for them to 
consider. The issuance of covered bond schemes across the globe has picked up 
considerably at 2009 and 2010 just after the crisis of 2007-2008 has made traditional 
sources of funding either too costly or unavailable to many banks.  
 
The idea and main contribution of the present article, of using the PPP contracts as 
collateral or protection for financing or securing debt, in a form of Sovereign 
covered bond, is new, and to our knowledge does not exist up to date in a formal and 
market acceptable structure. However, this is somehow logical, since until recently, 
many countries Sovereign debt was considered risk less, and financing for the state 
was cheap and available, making therefore a covered bond consideration obsolete. 
With the recent developments in the financial markets however, things have changed 
considerably regarding the available sources of debt refinancing for the Sovereigns.  
In this context, we believe that Sovereigns entities with growing deficits and heavy 
burdens of public debt should consider the option, of managing their refinancing 
needs and their available income generating assets in a more appropriate and 
coordinated way, in order to achieve optimal utilization and minimum cost financing 
and refinancing, being at the same time able to deliver a wide range of public 
services and investments. 
 
In section 2, we review the practices and usage of covered bonds from the private 
sector and we highlight the important benefits that arise for the issuers and investors.  
Also we list the obstacles that need to be addressed for a covered bond scheme in 
order to work in practice, and we review the recent market development of covered 
bonds worldwide after the Global financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
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Section 3 of the present article, we briefly review the available forms of PPP and the 
past experience on their success, as well as the modeling that is used by the states to 
evaluate the projects and the best bidder of the projects under consideration. 
We highlight the deficiencies of the above methodology for the state, and highlight 
the importance of a more complete pricing model for PPP projects that is close to 
market practices and makes the whole contract more tradable and transparent in 
terms of efficient pricing and risk. 
 
In section 4, considering the above, we propose ways that the notion of sovereign 
covered bond can be utilized in order to match the need for public investments and 
services with the availability of real assets in the Sovereign portfolio, and the 
restrictions of sovereign funding due to possible debt burden. 
 
In Section 5 we derive a general framework in which the State should consider the 
use of its real assets portfolio as collateral for debt servicing and the enhancement of 
public services provision, in order to achieve a range of multiple targets 
simultaneously.   
 
Section 6 concludes the article and proposes actions that can lead to the 
implementation of the above framework.     
 
2. Covered Bonds Primer 
Covered bonds, are debt instruments issued by financial institutions, collateralized 
by pools of mortgages or public debt or shipping mortgages that remain on the 
balance sheet of the issuer, in contrast to CDO’s or ABS where usually the collateral 
assets are transferred off the balance sheet, to an SPV. They are usually long term 
bullet amortizing bonds paying an annual fixed coupon. 
 
As debt instruments they first appeared in Prussia more than 200 years ago as 
“Pfandbriefs”. Under this name, today they are issued in Germany, the most liquid 
and biggest market in the world until recently. (Bujalance, Ferreira 2010). In more 
general terms, covered bonds are on balance sheet, asset backed bank funding 
instruments. The term covered bond has no legal protection or status. 
 
The most common features of covered bonds that are of value to prospective 
investors are: 
 Preferential claim of the investors against a dedicated pool of collateral 
(cover pool) or its proceeds. In the event of insolvency of the issuer, covered 
bond holders have privileged position, as seizure and foreclosure of 
collateral in the cover pool may only occur to meet their claims. 
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 Full recourse to the sponsor bank (issuer). As long as the issuer is a going 
concern, the bonds are direct obligations of this issuer (sponsor bank) and 
coupon and redemption payments are met by its operating cash flows. 
Covered bonds however have a dual recourse, meaning recourse both to the 
cover pool and the issuer, if the funds realized from the collateral in the 
cover pool are insufficient to meet their claims in full. With any unsatisfied 
claims (not covered by the cover pool of assets), covered bond investors 
usually rank at least on an equal footing with senior unsecured debt holders, 
against the total assets portfolio of the issuer. 
 Revolving/dynamic pool of assets. An issuer is legally required to keep 
(manage) the quality and size of the cover pool even if the quality of the 
overall balance sheet deteriorates. As long as covered bonds are outstanding 
the value of the pool must be able to meet the covered bondholders’ claims.  
 Covered bonds do not necessarily accelerate upon insolvency of the sponsor 
bank (issuer) but continue to make payments until their maturity. Covered 
bonds are usually not affected by the opening of insolvency proceedings in 
respect of an issuer’s assets. Therefore they do not accelerate provided there 
is no default or over-indebtedness of the cover pool in question. 
 Based on the above, in most legal frameworks of covered bonds, investors 
benefit from the “dual recourse” to the cover pool and the assets of the 
sponsor bank (issuer). The way in which such a dual recourse is achieved in 
practice is the main point of differentiation between products and can results 
in a variety of structures and legal frameworks. 
 The main benefits of the covered bonds to the investors relative to senior 
unsecured bonds of the same issuer (therefore of higher credit quality), 
include the less risky (dual recourse) nature of the covered bonds (yet even 
though many covered bonds issues are rated as AAA, they have much 
higher yields compared to AAA sovereign unsecured bonds), the possibility 
of less required regulatory capital (Basel III accord provision), favorable 
eligibility criteria, enhanced liquidity in stressed market conditions. 
 According to Credit Agricole Covered bonds – senior analyzer (5/9/2011), 
summing it all together, the main factors that should influence the 
relationship between senior unsecured and covered bonds spread level of an 
issuer are: 
 Quality of the issuer. The worse the issuer, the bigger the difference 
between senior unsecured and covered bond yields should be. 
 Quality of the covered bond framework. The better the covered bond 
framework, the more delinked a covered bond is from the issuer and the 
bigger the yield difference should be. 
 Quality of the collateral. The better the collateral backing the covered bonds, 
the lower the probability of having to rely on recoveries from the bank’s 
general insolvency estate, the higher the yield difference should be. 
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After the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, the covered bonds market has 
experienced an unprecedented expansion, internationally both in terms of volume 
and in terms of number of different issuers entering the market. 
 
Growth in benchmark volume was accompanied by ongoing globalization of the 
covered bond market. Increasing issuance activity from the Canadian Banks and first 
time issuance from the Asian Pacific region as well as planned issuance from 
Australia are signs of an important growth of covered bond issuance outside Europe, 
which has traditionally been the most active and robust covered bonds market.  
As the above market growth comes mostly from banking institutions, it is partially 
linked to the decreasing probability of public sector support for banks and the re-
pricing of senior unsecured debt. 
 
More precisely, the growing spread differentiation between covered bonds and 
senior unsecured bonds has increased the appeal of covered bonds to issuers as the 
potential to lower funding costs has increased. In the meanwhile, a large number of 
countries around the world have started to implement bank resolution regimes. 
These regimes (bail in regimes) aim to help regulators to deal more efficiently with 
failing banks while minimizing the potential impact on the tax payer. 
 
In certain cases this means that unsecured bond holders might have to share some of 
the burden of restructuring through haircuts on their claims. This growing concern, 
has led many investors to shift their focus more towards covered bonds, therefore 
creating significant additional demand for covered bonds. Also, demand for covered 
bonds is further supported by preferential regulatory treatment that covered bonds 
are to receive under BASLE 3 and Solvency II. 
 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 below depict facts about the growth and issuance in the covered 
bonds market until recently 
 
 
                     Figure 1                                                Figure 2 
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                                                   Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As for the rating methodologies that are used for covered bonds, these differ 
substantially in their approach between the three rating companies, S&P, FITCH, 
Moody’s, but result more or less to a very close final rating grade for the covered 
bond under consideration. (Poulain 2003), (ECBC 9/2010)  
 
However in all cases, the final notch upgrade from the issuers credit rating is 
substantial, and can vary from 2 to 7 notches higher depending on the treatment of 
the important issues in question for the covered bonds, especially the quality of the 
cover pool, the legal and regulatory framework, asset–liability mismatches, 
overcollateralization amounts, discontinuity of payments under insolvency of the 
issuer, etc. 
 
Also the relevant literature only recently has emerged with ideas to appropriately 
price the instruments available and the relevant citations are scarce and mostly by 
market participant researchers in large banks. (Kenyon 2009). The E.U. allows for 
cover bonds to qualify for a reduced risk weighting if they meet certain criteria as 
set out by the European Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) of June 2006. Also 
BASLE III will contain specific provisions for covered bonds, and CRD IV draft of 
July 2011 also has a much more detailed framework to enhance the use and 
credibility of the covered bond market in E.U. (Langer 2011). 
 
With regard to the above facts, we see that the concept of covered bonds, long used 
in financial market with varying specifications, is to receive a further boost after 
recent developments in the financial markets, mostly as a cheaper way of banks to 
refinance their activities. Legal frameworks exist, with varying success worldwide 
and the market is very familiar with the concept of this instrument. Also it is not by 
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chance that covered bonds historically were used as alternative ways of financing in 
times of crisis and funding constrained markets. (Packer, Stever, Upper 2007)2. 
 
Our proposal for a Sovereign covered bond scheme, is an extension of the existing 
market framework in order to meet a growing problem of many sovereign entities 
across Europe and the rest of the world that is, of refinancing their obligations at 
affordable levels, and at the same time mobilizing market wise their asset portfolio 
to their full potential. The adequate experience and appropriate national legislation 
regarding PPP contracts exist in many countries, and also the legislation to regulate 
issuance of covered bonds by banks. 
 
It remains therefore to the state to adequately meet the necessary requirements of the 
market, with appropriate regulation and pricing mechanisms that respond to the way 
that the actual market prices and trades collateralized obligations, especially per 
asset type. By offering through viable debt instruments the appropriate mix of risk 
and yield depending on the assets in its portfolio, the sovereign entity can achieve to 
a varying degree a wide range of its macroeconomic goals. 
 
3. PPP Existing Methodology 
Traditionally public sector was responsible for providing public goods and 
infrastructure to the society based on the fact that the state is the owner of the assets 
and the responsible party for the procurement of wide range of public goods. During 
the last decades the role of the State has been changed as many governments have 
implemented structural reforms and instead of owning the asset or services, public 
sector is becoming the designer of the services that will be provided in cooperation 
with the private sector. Fundamental condition for PPPs success is the risk sharing. 
Risk is transferred between involve parties according to who can manage the 
specific risk more efficient. The implementation of Public Private Partnership 
schemes between the public authorities and the private sector appears to be an 
effective and sufficient solution related to the maximum utilization of the assets 
belonging to the state. It can be applied both to large scale projects but also to 
smaller and less significant for the country’s economy. 
 
The aim of adopting PPP scheme is to ensure value for money (VFM) both for the 
cost and the quality of the services provided to the society compared with those 
provided under the traditional method where public agencies are responsible for 
financing, construction and operation of the projects. The VFM is achieved through 
the efficient allocation of business risk from the public sector to the private partner 
                                                 
2
 A great amount of information and related topics on the European covered bond market can 
be found on the site :  http://ecbc.hypo.org/Content/Default.asp 
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in the areas where the private sector is able to manage this risk better either due to 
its efficient structure or to its previous professional experience.  
 
PPPs can be applied not only to new infrastructure developments but also to existing 
projects or to real estate assets (office buildings, conference halls, stadiums, real 
estate assets, marinas, ports etc) belonging to public sector. Under this scenario 
governments have the ability not only to receive an income from the disposal of 
these assets under a PPP scheme (concession, long term lease, sale and lease back 
etc) to the private sector but also to avoid the necessary investment and spending for 
the maintenance and capital improvements of the assets that usually affects budget 
and balance sheet.     
 
By implementing PPP schemes for existing assets and infrastructures belonging to 
the government the state can receive from the private partner (operator of the 
project) a steady income during the entire contractual period which can be 30 years 
or even more. Therefore the asset automatically is converted to an income 
generating property for the public sector under a specific PPP contract with the 
private entity. This investment product can be evaluated with the conventional 
"Income Approach" applied to assess income-producing illiquid assets (stocks of 
private companies in industries not quoted on public exchanges, intangible assets, 
income-producing specialized real property etc).  
 
The scenario of providing as collaterals PPP contracts in order to structure special 
form of sovereign covered bonds issued by the government is currently under 
consideration by governments, investors, financial institutions etc. The entire 
process can be considered having three major discrete parts. The first part involves 
issues purely related to the covered bonds. The experience in covered bonds is wide 
especially in western markets, since financial institutions have been implemented 
structure bonds collateralized by pools of public debt, housing or shipping 
mortgages. The second part involves the mechanism of structuring PPP projects 
where the experience is also significant especially into developed countries since 
they have been applied many decades ago. The final and the most important step is 
how PPP contracts can be used by governmental authorities in order to provide 
sufficient structured covered bonds. 
 
PPP projects and contracts can be classified according to various parameters 
however one of the most significant is the nature of the revenues from the operation 
of the facility. Revenues can be paid either by the end user of the services (ie tolls 
for roads, mooring fees for marinas or ports etc) or by the state (when it is buying 
services in hospitals, prisons etc) or from both.  
 
Since the underlying asset to the covered bond will be a PPP project/contract, the 
type of the contract (and hence the nature of the cooperation between the public 
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sector and the private entities) is the driving factor.  Projects implemented under 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) schemes where the public sector does not participate 
in the shareholding structure of the SPV developing and operating the project 
(infrastructure or asset) but only pays to the private entity for services sold to the 
public sector, cannot be considered as collateral since there are not any revenues 
generated for the government but only expenses during the life of the project.  
 
Similar to pools of public debt, housing mortgages and shipping loans the covered 
bonds should be linked with PPP projects that their future stream of revenues for the 
state is defined from the outset and are able to cover bondholders’ claim.  Although 
each project developed under a PPP scheme will always have the risk of under – 
performance or default this is a risk that can be evaluated by the bondholder, but in 
order to evaluate each project as an income generating product for the state it is 
important to know the future revenues. 
 
Projects that meet the above requirements related to the best possible knowledge of 
the future income for the state are those known as concession projects and especially 
the leasehold concession projects applied mainly to existing infrastructure belonging 
to the state such as ports and container terminals (Wiegmans B. 2002), marinas, 
governmental buildings, stadiums, land plots etc.  The private sector undertakes to 
construct or renovate and operate the infrastructure or the asset for a specific time 
period providing remuneration to the state under a specific concession agreement. 
The agreement can last 30 years or even more and after its expiration the asset 
returns to the state. Usually the compensation to the public sector is being paid on a 
yearly basis while at the signing of the agreement a lump sum fee can be applied.  
 
The agreement defines the yearly fee as well as its adjustments during the 
contractual period. Depending on the contract and the nature of the project, the 
ownership of the underlying asset either remains to the government or the private 
operator typically becomes the legal owner for the period of the operating contract. 
If the government continues to bear the risk normally associated with the ownership, 
it is in this effect the economic owner of the asset (IMF, 2004). When considering 
PPP contracts that generate a steady income for the state, during the projects’ period, 
to be used as collaterals for governmental bonds it does not imply any liquidation of 
the asset or privatization through transfer of the ownership to the bondholder. 
Projects generating income for the state have an added value that derives from the 
PPP agreement with the private partner. This agreement is the factor that converts 
the assets from typical properties to investment products that can be evaluated by 
investors. These PPP agreements can be assigned from the state (issuer) to the 
bondholder as a securitization of the provided debt.  
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Under this scenario the holder mitigates his risk since he has additional different 
collateral from a private entity that operates the asset, and this should be taken into 
consideration when pricing the bond and calculating the cost of borrowing. Annual 
fixed coupons can be related with the annual inflows for the state under the existing 
PPP agreements. In essence government can capitalize today future expected 
inflows at a better discount rate.  
 
In order for the PPP agreements to be considered as strong and efficient collateral 
some fundamental parameters and procedures should be followed, similar to those 
when the underlying asset are other collaterals (such as public debt, housing or 
shipping mortgages): 
 
Pool of assets. Governmental authorities should establish a pool of existing assets 
generating revenues for the state under PPP agreements that can be provided as 
collateral to cover bonds. Significant importance must be given to the diversification 
and differentiation of the projects in order to mitigate the damages/risk from a 
default of a specific sector. For example if we consider a pool of assets containing 
only office buildings owned by the state and operated by private partners it is clear 
that a decline in the office real estate market will affect the total value of the pool 
significant compared with the case that also other type of assets were included in the 
portfolio (ie ports, marinas, stadiums, conference centers). 
 
Efficient structure and proper monitoring of the pool containing the assets is very 
significant since this will define the quality of the collateral provided to cover the 
issued bonds by the state. PPP contract agreements should be competent developed 
according to the International experience and based on the directives from the EU 
while the government agencies should monitor and assess the progress of the project 
according to the contract and secure the proper fulfillment of parties’ obligations.      
1. Quality of the product. Valuation of the asset pool and expected cash flows 
should be consistent with the scheduled obligations towards bondholders. In 
addition projects that appear to face important problems and as a result the 
private partner (concessioner) deviates from his contractual obligations 
should not be included in the portfolio.  
 
2. Legal and regulatory framework for PPPs. It is very important that the PPP 
contracts are structured based on a solid and defined legal framework in 
consistence with the directions of the European Union and its relevant 
authorities. This framework is essential for PPPs success in general 
regardless if they meet the criteria to be provided as collateral to cover 
bonds or not. Since PPP projects are developed within the environment of 
the real economy in incomplete markets, the existence of the relevant 
regulation framework appears to be significant. Regulation implies rules and 
politics (either new or reformation of the existing when needed) in relation 
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to the issues such as taxation, legislation defining PPPs, stable political 
willingness from the government, education and training of the state 
agencies that are involved in the implementation of PPPs, control over the 
bureaucratic procedures within the state authorities.  
 
3. Legal framework for defining the pool. The relevant legislation should be 
established in order all the aforementioned assets to be consolidated into a 
portfolio (most probably to an SPV belonging to the state). Legislation 
should provide solutions related to the ability of the SPV to assign to 
bondholders the PPP agreements in order to connect entirely or partially the 
coupons of the covered bond (fixed and optionally component) to the assets’ 
utilization (income). The portfolio of the assets should be structured in a 
way that it could be rebalanced either by including more governmental 
assets that are utilized by PPP schemes or excluding those that either are 
performing far below expectations or those whose the contractual period is 
expired and its operation is transferred back to the owner (state).   
 
Efficient structure of the assets pool that will be provided as collateral to cover 
government bonds is the parameter that finally will be evaluated from bond holders. 
The higher the quality of the pool the lower is the risk for the bond holders and as a 
consequence this will be depicted into the cost of borrowing for the state. 
 
4. Use of PPP as Collateral Pool on Sovereign Covered Bonds 
Taking into account the limitations and the different structures of possible qualified 
state assets to be considered as collateral, we propose mainly two distinct schemes 
that can be used by the state to achieve a variety of targets as mentioned in earlier 
chapter.  
 
The first and most simple possible use of proceeds of correctly priced P.P.P. 
agreements, is to repay interest and capital to existing Public debt. Very useful and 
important to the state, if the above scheme is used, is to match the cash flow profile 
of the existing bond issues, or prospective ones, with the cash flow profile expected 
from the P.P.P. contracts. This will eliminate any cash flow mismatching and will 
make the debt scheduling of the state more controllable and manageable. 
 
The marketing and monitoring of revenues of existing and prospective P.P.P. 
contracts and their cash flows, received or to be received will have a positive impact 
on the market of existing bond issues. Under this scheme, the private sector runs the 
business risk, and government utilizes the knowhow of the private sector to mobilize 
revenues from very large illiquid assets that cannot be sold (airports, highways, 
bridges, marinas, ports, etc.), and also the final ownership of the asset will remain to 
the state. 
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Instead of the state running balance deficits to finance and maintain such 
infrastructures, the state appropriately structures and prices their economic value and 
cash flows, and provides the private sector with the initiative to run efficiently 
previous state monopolies with private sector market standards, while the state 
assigns itself the role of regulator and manager of valuable economic assets.  
In theory partly matching the refinancing needs of the state with cash flows expected 
by such PPP projects, is a logical goal for the Sovereign welfare.
3
  
 
The second proposed scheme, is the issuance of sovereign covered bonds, secured 
by the proceeds and assets managed from and leased to the private company that 
will run the P.P.P. contract linked to the specific bond issuance. This scheme of 
Sovereign covered bonds, is potentially a less risky investment than the senior 
unsecured debt of a sovereign entity, expected therefore to have a smaller yield than 
the corresponding senior unsecured bonds of the state. 
 
Depending on the legal and regulatory framework (controlled and forced by the 
state), these sovereign covered bond structures can actually have a very different 
underlying entity risk than the state itself, if the appropriate framework segregates 
the sovereign default risk from the default risk of the bond structure.  
 
In this framework, a correctly over-collateralized portfolio of many liquid State 
assets, managed by private enterprises, where by the coupons of the bonds are linked 
entirely or partially (fixed and optionality component) to the annual proceeds of the 
asset’s utilization, will be priced at more favorable levels than an outright unsecured 
issue. 
Also in case of issuer (Sovereign) default the bonds will continue to run their 
payments until maturity, or in case of bonds default due to private enterprise risk, 
the bond holders are compensated either by management of the asset by new private 
operator or even in some cases by liquidation or ownership of the underlying assets 
portfolio. However when a pool of assets has been established then the 
underperformance of a project that might affect the payment from the private 
operator to the state can be eliminated by rebalancing the pool and substitute the 
problematic project with some other of equal value for the state. With the approach 
the risk for the bond holders related to the performance of some projects provided as 
collaterals can be eliminated. 
 
Alternatively, the sovereign is responsible for finding a new enterprise to run the 
business in a more viable business level, paying the fixed amount of the coupon 
                                                 
3 Though the state had historically very poor capability of setting quality standards for state produced 
services and products, through regulatory practices in PPP projects, it can actually bye this quality from 
the private sector, and assign the regulatory role to the state regarding the delivery of such qualitative 
characteristics in the PPP projects.  
30 
European Research Studies, XVII (3), 2014 
E. Tassopoulos , S. Theodoropoulos 
 
until then. In all cases, the bonds framework provisions are targeted towards 
segregating the risk of the bonds to the risk of the sovereign and ensuring that in any 
case the bonds continue to yield their expected cash flows to the holders until 
maturity. 
 
In these schemes, business risk is run by the private enterprise operating the assets, 
while the Sovereign bears the risk of losing the ownership of the assets portfolio, 
therefore giving an advantage to the possible bond holders, compensated for the 
risks they take (market risk, business risk, liquidity risk, default risk) appropriately.  
Also, the above structure, provide the bondholders with the alternative to get 
exposure to risks and specific assets that previously were unattainable to them 
directly. 
 
In all cases, prospective bondholders switch their risk focus from the state to the 
business risk credibility of the company running the asset portfolio and to the quality 
and fair value of the underlying asset portfolio, making the whole bond structure 
more liquid and changing its risk profile substantially away from the traditional 
Sovereign risk. 
 
5. Pricing and Marketing PPP Projects, Meeting the Multiple Targets of the 
Sovereign Balance Sheet 
 
By implementing PPP schemes for existing assets and infrastructures belonging to 
the government (real estate assets, marinas, ports etc) the state can receive from the 
private partner (operator of the project) a steady income during the entire contractual 
period.  
 
Therefore the asset automatically is converted to an income generating property for 
the public sector under a specific PPP contract with the private entity. This 
investment product can be evaluated with the conventional "Income Approach" 
applied to assess income-producing illiquid assets (stocks of private companies in 
industries not quoted on public exchanges, intangible assets, income-producing 
specialized real property etc).  
 
This estimate is developed in the income approach by capitalizing the projected net 
income at a rate commensurate with investment risks inherent to the ownership of 
the property or the generated income. Such a conversion of income considers 
competitive returns offered by alternate investment opportunities. When properly 
applied, this approach is generally considered to provide a reliable indication of 
value for income generating properties. 
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Typically basic inputs and assumptions that need to be estimated to arrive at a value 
indication using DCF calculations are: 
 
 holding/projection period, at the end of which the income is deemed 
stabilized generated income, taking into consideration the terms provided 
under the agreement between the owner of the asset (public sector) and the 
operator (private entity) 
 reversionary value, present value of the asset at the end of the projected 
period 
 discount and overall capitalization rates, applicable to the income stream 
and the reversionary value. 
 
In more detail, the existing model by which the Public sector prices and assesses the 
economic value of an established or prospective PPP project is the following: 
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P.V. = Best price of bidder 
A = Upfront amount 
f = Weight factor of upfront amount 
K= Fixed annual payment 
N= Number of PPP life years 
R= Fixed interest rate 
I= Fixed inflation rate 
 
The above existing model for choosing the preferred bidder of PPP (concession) 
projects, is incomplete and very simplistic from a market point of view, and it does 
not relate to the actual expected cash flows of the PPP project, or the existing 
economic fundamentals, such as interest rates curve, inflation expectations and 
borrowing costs for Sovereign and Private company. 
 
Also, the model does not in any way take into account, the risk of the expectation 
(present value dynamics), or provisions in any way to calculate it, deviating 
considerably from standard market practices. It assumes an irrational upfront 
payment amount to the state weighted by a factor chosen separately and 
independently for each PPP project, and discounts the fixed annual payments 
(adjusted each year by an arbitrarily fixed inflation amount) to a fixed interest rate 
chosen depending on the project under consideration.  
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Also the residual value of the project after the end of life of the PPP contract is not 
taken into account, not even as a rough estimation.  In the above setting, the 
preferred bidder has a rational to place a bid in such a way that conforms to the most 
crucial factors affecting the present value of the project, in order to make it as large 
as possible. 
 
However, the sole number of net present value is very poor to describe a financial 
cash flows structure of such a complexity affected by many correlated risk factors, 
spanning usually for over 25 years. In order to bring this model and its assumption 
closer to market practices and to consider it as pricing mechanism for collateral for 
Sovereign PPP covered bonds, and to make these bonds acceptable in the market, 
major modifications have to be made. 
 
In this process, first there is the need to price the project in line with actual market 
expectations, and secondly, when this is achieved, to include it as collateral to 
covered bonds schemes and accordingly price the covered bond with collateral the 
correctly priced PPP in question.  However the above two steps are very much 
connected to each other, and in many cases depending on the final bond structure 
they are one and identical procedure. 
 
The general framework for pricing any type of contingent claims as bond structures, 
with optionality included in the coupon structure is the following, making an 
adjustment for a possible upfront amount to have in to consideration the existing 
practice for choosing the preferred bidder on PPP projects. 
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V0= Net present value 
A = possible upfront payment 
H = Upfront weight factor 
K= fixed annual payments 
I = annual adjustment index (Inflation, interest rates, etc.) 
O = annual optionality index linked to quantitative or qualitative project parameters 
R = market risk free interest rate plus credit spread of issuer country 
Q = credit enhancement due to quality of underlying asset pool, over-
collateralization, legal framework, credibility of the private property manager, credit 
rating up pick from better bond structure, or project specific cash flow risk. 
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F= final residual value of the collateral asset, possibly amortized during the life of 
the project, or evaluated meeting certain qualitative criteria (depending on needs of 
public sector). 
 
The above model or equation, is namely a present value of future expected cash 
flows, discounted at an appropriate rate of return being the present borrowing cost of 
the bond issuer (risk free rate plus credit spread), and adjusted possibly by favorable 
collateral and legal frameworks, making the discount rate lower and the present 
value of the project higher. 
 
The risk factors of the above model (i.e. its dynamics in a “continuous time” 
framework) in the more specific setting of a covered bonds secured by PPP 
agreements (underlying assets pool and expected cash flows), would be as follows:  
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The state, has the moderate control of most of the numerator variables in equation 
(2), such as the annual fixed payments, any residual value to be expected, or any 
adjustment or optionality elements to the annual cash flows, and increasing them 
will potentially make the market price (present value) of the bond higher. 
 
As we see in equation (3) all the variables that connect to the cash flow component 
increase the present value of such a structure as is expected, and the Issuer (i.e. the 
State) has the option to adjust the final structure of each project in order to achieve a 
present value that is accepted by market standards, such as the fixed amount of cash 
flows, any adjustment index (inflation, interest rates level, annual total profits of 
SPV managing the assets etc.), or optionality components (contract provisions that 
enable the state to renegotiate terms of the contract in the future depending on 
project and market parameter values), aside from the fixed annual payments, and the 
final residual value. 
 
We also see that the dynamics of such a bond structure do not depend at all from the 
initial upfront payment, which in our view is an obstacle to any private company 
considering the bidding of PPP projects, since it requires the upfront commitment of 
cash amounts without any immediate risk reward. We believe that from an asset 
liability management perspective the requirement of an upfront fee from the private 
company that is bidding the PPP agreement to the state, is irrational and distorts the 
overall bond structure and prospects of future expected cash flows, while it 
deliberately favors bidders that can place this upfront amount, not weighting 
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appropriately the future cash flows to the state, or the risks associated with the final 
bond structure. 
 
In any relevant bond structure there is no provision for such an amount and in order 
for the PPP covered bonds to be accepted and viable in market conditions, this 
amount should be excluded initially and if necessary for the state, to structure it and 
amortize or accredit it accordingly to the overall bond structure.  However the key 
components that will make a large difference to the pricing of the above structure 
are the denominators values, the interest rate and the possible credit enhancement 
mechanism included in the covered bond structure. 
 
Due to market conditions and specific Sovereign limitations, the market can adjust 
the Sovereign specific interest rates through appropriate levels of credit spreads, a 
variable that is not controlled by the state as well. The only way for the state in a 
difficult situation such as many Sovereigns on the E.U. to control and lower the 
market accepted yield level directly (the general curve of the denominators on the 
above model), is through the control (by market acceptable standards) of the credit 
enhancement factor Q. 
 
This in our view can be accomplished (as in the private sector banks) by providing 
extra security conditions to the prospective bond holders – investors. Appropriate 
overcollateralization of the covered bond issue is also a standard market practice 
used in such situations, on top of the above, as well as strong legal framework that 
guarantees the prospective bond holders in cases of Sovereign default. 
 
PPP projects have these advantages to a large extent, since the management of the 
assets, is made through private sector standards, while at the same time, the 
Sovereign achieves a wide range of its objectives such as : 
Issuance of debt at lower yield levels. 
Utilization of state asset portfolio in more efficient and competitive way. 
Mobilization of market funds and know how to different sectors of the economy. 
Provision of public services more efficiently and with private sector standards. 
Positive economic externalities in the areas and locations of underlying assets 
portfolio.    
 
In practice, the bond structure relates part of the expected cash flows of the PPP 
management to coupons of the covered bond (apart from the over-collateralized 
feature of the underlying assets) the present value of which covered bond coupons 
should be lower than the total NPV expected by the PPP agreement, since part of 
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this present value is given as compensation to the private entity for taking on and 
managing the related risks.
4
 
 
However, this bond will have better credit quality and lower discount factors of 
future cash flows because of the over-collateralized underlying portfolio, translating 
to a higher price at present. A risk correlated to the above setting is that in times of 
liquidity drainage and severe economic downturn, the might be difficult to find 
actual bidders for PPP projects initially. This risk has to be coped case by case by 
providing even more favorable terms in the contract for the private entity, in order to 
achieve a market price for the project. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this piece of research, we propose and elaborate on the idea of using PPP projects 
in order to improve the debt profiling of Sovereign entities. By explaining the 
paradigm of covered bonds issued in the private sector we highlight the important 
factors affecting their success so far, and underline the obstacles that have to be 
addressed by the State in order for such a framework to be viable in the case of 
sovereign covered bond issuance. 
 
We explain the deficiencies of the existing PPP model for the choice of the preferred 
bidder used by the state, and propose a more general model that is closer to market 
standards and can be accepted by market participants in order to link the income 
generating PPP portfolio of assets, to the pricing and issuance of covered bonds. 
We propose two different possible uses of correctly priced PPP projects, which will 
help the State to repay part of its existing debt, or refinance part of it by issuing 
bonds acceptable in the market with more favorable rates (lower credit spread). 
Also, we propose a more complete asset liability management approach for the state 
regarding its range of multiple targets and available resources, and we list the 
benefits in this setting of issuing covered bonds as proposed in this article. 
The main contribution of the research lies in listing the conditions and benefits of 
the idea of bridging the PPP and asset side of the state, with the problematic liability 
side, in worsening global conditions after the financial crisis of 2008, and the 
subsequent Sovereign crisis we experience today. This bridge, especially in difficult 
market conditions, can provide liquidity with more favorable terms to the state, 
while giving a considerable boost in the real economy by utilizing efficiently assets 
of the State. 
 
                                                 
4
 The level of this difference is correlated with the quality and the risks of the provided 
collateral and their appreciation by the bond holder.  
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Side effects of the success of such an approach as positive economic externalities 
are to be expected as well. Appropriate quantitative models for such a bridge exist in 
the market, and depend on the specific assets and market conditions under 
consideration. 
 
At the bottom line, the State should be the overall manager of its assets and 
liabilities, speaking the language of private markets and using its knowhow in order 
to translate its goals efficiently into benefits for the economy. Any such linkages and 
options should be considered and worked upon, especially in States where the 
traditional channel of funding is limited or prohibited, while on the other side, 
considerable amount of assets remain substantially unutilized. 
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